conclusions as to the basis of angle illusions on a picture's surface are not justified by their data, which cannot in principle differentiate between their proposal and the proposed alternatives.
investigate viewers' ability to accurately judge the size of angles printed on the page, and offer a hypothesis to explain their results. The authors also argue against several alternative explanations, including one that they refer to as 'a version of Gestalt theory'. I argue that the authors' experiment does not and cannot in principle differentiate among their own proposed alternatives.
Hammad et al. frame the issue in terms of the compromise between the 3-D perceptual shape a drawing may elicit and its actual 2-D form on the picture plane. A compelling 3-D impression, in the context of which a closed form may be seen as tilted away from the picture plane, interferes with a viewer's ability to judge the shape of the 2-D instigator of that impression, despite the awareness that one is looking at a flat picture plane. This interference is often not complete, so that the estimation of a particular parameter of a figure is intermediate between the two alternative descriptions. Employing figures drawn in three-point-perspective and derived from projections of cubes having various tilts around the horizontal, the authors asked viewers to judge the size of one acute and one obtuse angle on the upper face of each figure.
The authors' propose that the 'crosstalk' and compromise between the 2-D and the 3-D percept (which they refer to as a cube) arises as a result of the perception of perspective convergence of the edges of the side faces of the phenomenal cubes.
They then point out that this convergence is too mild to be detectable at slight or extreme tilts of the cube, but is greater at intermediate tilts. They predict that this greater salience of the converging lines will create a more pronounced bias on the part of viewers to perceive the relevant angles as close to 90
• when the figures depict cubes at intermediate tilts. They conclude that their hypothesis is supported by the fact that 'obtuse angles are underestimated and acute angles overestimated, closer to 90
• than is the case, over a wide range of angles', with the larger errors observed at tilts intermediate between 5 and 85
• . Convergence is, in their account, the underlying cause of the 'crosstalk' between the non-right-angled 2-D figures and the 3-D percepts that produces the tendency for angles to appear closer to 90
• ; this is equivalent to saying that convergence is responsible for the perception of the figures as right-angled volumes (and all their sides, including the top, as right-angled quadrilaterals).
While both casual inspection and the results of the experiment are consistent with the assumption that the figures tend to be perceived as right-angled volumes, it is not at all clear how these data can prove convergence to be the chief cause of this effect. It could be, for example, that the object being depicted has rectangular sides, and is tilted so that its lower edges converge, but that it has diamond-shaped top with two acute and two obtuse angles, rather than a square-shaped one. In this case, the angles would be distorted in the projection, but there would be no pretext for a perceptual 'attraction' to 90
• . Or, the object could have no tilt at all, but simply edges converging in the frontal-parallel plane. Even if convergence is taken as incontrovertible evidence of tilt, this does not constrain the shape of the top of the object nor does it require that the top have a right-angled relationship to the sides.
Also, as the authors themselves note in their discussion, convergence is not necessary to produce phenomenal cubes. Arnheim (1974, p. 267) has observed that a cube drawn in isometric perspective (i.e., with sides parallel) appears to us as a 'coherent, faithfully portrayed cube'. To the degree, then, that the observed bias in angle perception is contingent on the 3-D result, we should expect the same outcomes whether or not convergence is employed in the construction of the stimuli, and regardless of the degree of convergence resulting from a particular projection. Without performing the same tests on forms drawn in isometric perspective, it is not possible to say that they would differ in their outcomes from the experiments reported here (I think they would not). The smaller size of the effect at slighter apparent tilts of the figures may well be due to the greater distortion in their upper face, which may make the wholes appear, not as cubes but, for example, as forms with diamond-shaped upper (and, assuming symmetry, lower) faces. Conversely, at extreme tilts, there is not much room for error, since the angles of the top face are nearly 90
• to begin with. Hammad et al. pit their results against three alternatives that they term the Extreme Foreshortening, Gestalt and Cognitive hypotheses. The predictions they assign to these alternatives are either unjustified and/or improperly differentiate them from the convergence account.
